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ITS NOT CALLED CONDUCT THERAPY; TALK THERAPY
AS A PROTECTED FORM OF SPEECH UNDER THE
FIRST AMENDMENT
Warren Geoffrey Tucker*
INTRODUCTION
Many states regulate the practice of psychotherapy through a licensing board
operated by the state. Like with doctors or lawyers, those not licensed to practice psy-
chotherapy are normally prohibited from doing so. While there have been numerous
cases arguing that such a regulation necessarily infringes on the free speech rights of
those wishing to practice these professions, courts often hold that there is no constitu-
tional infringement as these laws serve to further legitimate state interests.1
Unlike medical doctors and attorneys, however, there is a dearth of case law
prohibiting specific psychological treatments. As will be discussed, there are a num-
ber of regulations and laws limiting not only who may practice psychotherapy, but
also the duties and obligations accompanying licensure in that field. However, until
very recently, there were no laws saying what kind of therapy a psychologist is not al-
lowed to engage in. This recent California law, SB 1172,2 prohibits the practice of gay
conversion therapy on minors, even those forms of therapy relying wholly or mostly
on speech.3
The Ninth Circuit recently upheld this law in Pickup v. Brown (Pickup II), stating
unequivocally that this law does not violate the First Amendment because it only regu-
lates conduct, not speech.4 Because the law still allows therapists to discuss and recom-
mend the therapy, the court found that their First Amendment rights were not affected.5
The only thing the therapist cannot do, reasoned the court, is engage in the actual
* J.D., William & Mary Law School, 2015; M.A., Pepperdine University School of
Education and Psychology, 2012; B.A., Pepperdine University, 2010. I would like to thank my
parents and sister for their continuous support and encouragement, Professor Timothy Zick for
his guidance in finding this topic, and the Volume 23 editorial staff for selecting and preparing
this Note for publication.
1 See Natl Assn for Advancement of Psychoanalysis v. Cal. Bd. of Psychology, 228
F.3d 1043, 1046 (9th Cir. 2000).
2 CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE § 865.1 (West 2013).
3 See Pickup v. Brown (Pickup II), 740 F.3d 1208, 1220 (9th Cir. 2013) (describing the
limitations placed on therapists through this bill).
4 Id. at 122930.
5 Id. at 1229.
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therapy itself.6 The court pointed to a number of similar regulations in the medical field
preventing or compelling a doctors speech.7
While the Supreme Court refused to grant certiorari on this particular case,8 more
and more states are considering enacting similar legislation. New Jersey alreadypassed
such a law, which was instantly challenged and recently ruled constitutional by the
Third Circuit.9 It seems likely, however, that the Supreme Court may grant certiorari
if this issue appears before it again, especially if one of the other circuits decides the
case differently. This could have far-reaching consequences for the practice of psycho-
therapy, as the Supreme Courts affirmation of the Ninth Circuits reasoning would
make it very easy to ban any sort of therapy without much concrete evidence. While
most people may view this revolving around the issue of sexual orientation, this case
will have an effect on an entirely different issue.
As this Note will discuss, there are basic and inherent differences between
psychotherapy, and talk therapy in particular, and other regulated professions such
as law and medicine.10 Unlike those professions, speech is often the primary vehicle
through which psychological treatment is delivered. Furthermore, a psychologist takes
much of him or herself into the therapy room when meeting a client, which is often
used to elicit change. Restricting the speech which may occur in session may weaken
the efficacy of the treatment; the clients sense that the therapist is withholding infor-
mation or treatment options could harm the connection that forms between the client
and therapist.
This is not to say, however, that all types of therapy should be acceptable, nor does
it support the idea of gay conversion therapy in any way whatsoever. Instead, this Note
suggests that the communication which occurs during a session between a therapist
and client is pure speech, especially when it is being used as the sole tool for change.11
Psychotherapy is unique in that speech often lies at the heart of the practice, and the
practice cannot be regulated in the same vein as the medical and legal fields. Thus, this
Note will argue that, unlike other professions, laws prohibiting a certain type of therapy
should be held to strict scrutiny and require a state to show a compelling interest in
banning it.12
This Note will first discuss the importance of Pickup II13 on the psychological
profession.14 Secondly, Part II will briefly examine the ways in which the legal and
6 Id. at 1223.
7 Id. at 1229.
8 Pickup v. Brown, 134 S. Ct. 2871 (2014).
9 King v. Governor of New Jersey, 767 F.3d 216, 224 (3d Cir. 2014). As will be discussed,
the Third Circuit actuallyheld that the law affected speech, and upheld the law after applying an
intermediate scrutiny analysis. Id. at 224, 237.
10 See Part II.C.
11 See Part II.B.1.
12 See Part II.B.2.
13 740 F.3d 1208, 1208 (9th Cir. 2013).
14 See Part I.C.
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medical fields are regulated, as well as the existing regulations in place for mental
health professionals.15 Part III will address the ways in which the connection between
the therapist and client is unique to other client-professional relationships, and will
argue that speech is affected much more through wide-sweeping bans on psychother-
apy than with regulations placed on lawyers and medical physicians.16 Finally, Part IV
of this Note will discuss alternatives to broad bans on particular forms of therapy, such
as obtaining sufficient evidence to satisfy heightened review, regulating only those
treatments which are not heavily imbued with speech, and requiring more rigorous
informed consent.17
I. THE IMPORTANCE OF PICKUP V. BROWN
A. Senate Bill 1172
On September 29, 2012, the Governor of California signed a bill making it illegal
for a mental health provider to practice sexual orientation change efforts (SOCE) on
minors.18 Senate Bill 1172 (SB 1172) defines SOCE as any practices by mental health
providers that seek to change an individuals sexual orientation. This includes efforts
to change behaviors of gender expressions, or to eliminate or reduce romantic attrac-
tions or feelings toward individuals of the same sex.19
This bill was drafted after a Task Force from the American Psychological Associa-
tion (APA) went through all of the available literature on SOCE and concluded that it
is harmful and not proven to be efficacious.20 However, methodological problems in
the reviewed literature made it difficult for the Task Force to make a broad conclu-
sion on the harm and efficacy of SOCE.21 Indeed, the Task Force often relied on anec-
dotal evidence instead of empirical data:
A central issue in the debates regarding efforts to change same-sex
sexual attractions concerns the risk of harm to people that may
result from attempts to change their sexual orientation. . . . Al-
though the recent studies do not provide valid causal evidence of
the efficacy of SOCE or of its harm, some recent studies document
that there are people who perceive that they have been harmed
through SOCE.22
15 See Part II.
16 See Part III.
17 See Part IV.
18 Welch v. Brown, 907 F. Supp. 2d 1102, 1105 (E.D. Cal. 2012), overruled by Pickup II,
740 F.3d at 1208.
19 CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE § 865(b)(1) (West 2013).
20 Pickup v. Brown(Pickup I), No. 2:12-CV-02497-KJM-EFB, 2012 WL 6021465, at *56
(E.D. Cal. Dec. 4, 2012), affd by, Pickup II, 740 F.3d at 1208.
21 Id. at *25.
22 American Psychological Association,Report of the American Psychological Association
Task Force on Appropriate Therapeutic Responses to Sexual Orientation, 41-42 (2009),
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However, while this bill prevents licensed mental health professionals from practicing
the therapy, it does not prevent them from discussing or recommending SOCE therapy
to adults or minors.23 Furthermore, they may even refer clients seeking SOCE to unli-
censed professionals, such as religious officials, and may practice this therapy on
consenting adults.24
B. The District Court Split and the Ninth Circuit Decision
This bill was quickly challenged in two separate district court cases. In the first of
these cases, Welch v. Brown,25 SOCE practitioners argued that this law unconstitu-
tionally violated their First Amendment rights.26 The court in Californias Eastern Dis-
trict noted that many mental health professionals engaging in SOCE did so through
speech using talk therapy.27 In determining this, the court ruled that this law would
likely be subject to strict scrutiny and was likely to fail that heightened standard of
review.28 Thus, the court issued a preliminary injunction against the law until the case
was fully resolved.29
Conversely, a day after the Welch decision was reached, another court in the
Eastern District of California found the law was likely to pass constitutional muster,
applying a rational basis test instead of heightened review.30 The court compared the
instant case with Conant v. Walters,31 where the Ninth Circuit ruled a law prohibiting
physicians from merely recommending marijuana to patients unconstitutional.32 The
court reasoned that, unlike the law in Conant, mental health professionals were still
free to discuss and recommend SOCE.33 Because theywere only enjoined from utiliz-
ing the actual therapy itself, the court explained that this law merelyprohibited conduct
and not speech.34 Thus, the court applied rational basis review, ultimately declaring
that California had a legitimate, rational reason for prohibiting this practice by mental
health professionals.35
http://www.apa.org/pi/lgbt/resources/therapeutic-response.pdf [hereinafter APA Report]
(emphasis added).
23 Pickup II, 740 F.3d at 122324.
24 Id.
25 907 F. Supp. 2d 1102 (E.D. Cal. 2012).
26 Id. at 1105 n. 1.
27 Id. at 1113.
28 Id. at 1121.
29 Id. at 1122.
30 Pickup I, No. 2:12-CV-02497-KJM-EFB, 2012 WL 6021465, at *24 (E.D. Cal. Dec. 4,
2012), affd by, Pickup II, 740 F.3d 1208 (9th Cir. 2013).
31 309 F.3d 629 (9th Cir. 2002).
32 Pickup I, 2012 WL 6021465, at *8 (citing Conant, 309 F.3d at 638.).
33 Id. at *9.
34 Id.
35 Id. at *2426.
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In August of 2013, the Ninth Circuit resolved this district court split, overruling
Welch and holding that this law prohibited conduct, not speech.36 The court held that
licensed mental health professions were still able to convey their opinions and recom-
mendations to clients.37 Because they were only estopped from engaging in the actual
therapy itself, the court ruled that SB 1172 did not regulate speech and was subject to
rational basis review.38 The court held that California has great power to regulate pro-
fessional conduct, even though such regulation may have an incidental effect on
speech.39 Just as doctors cannot use the speech necessary to actually provide an illegal
drug through a prescription, the court reasoned, so too is a mental health professional
prohibited from using the words necessary to facilitate SOCE treatment.40
While the Ninth Circuit denied a motion to rehear the case en banc, Judge
OScannlain provided a dissenting opinion as to the reasoning used to decide Pickup
II, which was joined by two other judges.41 He argued that the court arbitrarily labeled
such expression as conduct, noting, [t]he panel provides no principled doctrinal
basis for its dichotomy: by what criteria do we distinguish between utterances that
are truly speech, on the one hand, and those that are, on the other hand, somehow
treatment or conduct?42 He stated that SB 1172 is essentially a vehicle to silence po-
litically unpopular expression43 and the Ninth Circuits ruling will give government
more power to silence expression based on a political or moral judgment.44 Thus,
while he declined to find that SB 1172 necessarily violated the First Amendment,45 he
averred that some level of scrutiny was required.46
C. Consequences of this Decision
Since California passed SB 1172, other states are beginning to follow suit. Shortly
before the Ninth Circuit made its ruling, New Jersey became the second state to pro-
hibit mental health professionals from practicing gayconversion therapy.47 Mere days
after this bill was signed into law, a lawsuit was filed against it.48 On November 8,
36 Pickup II, 740 F.3d 1208, 1222 (9th Cir. 2013).
37 Id. at 1223.
38 Id. at 123031.
39 Id. at 1229.
40 Id.
41 Id. at 1215 (OScannlain, J., dissenting).
42 Id. at 121516.
43 Id. at 1215.
44 Id. at 1216.
45 Id. at 1221.
46 Id. at 1217.
47 See N.J. STAT. ANN. § 45:1-55 (West 2013), available at http://www.njleg.state.nj.us
/bills/BillView.asp; Susan K. Livio, N.J. Gay Conversion Therapy Ban for Kids Challenged
in Federal Court, NJ.COM (Aug. 26, 2013 3:17 AM), http://www.nj.com/politics/index.ssf
/2013/08/nj_gay_conversion_therapy_ban_for_kids_challenged_by_therapist_groups.html.
48 See Livio, supra note 47.
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2013, a federal judge in the District of New Jersey granted the states motion for
summary judgment, upholding the prohibition.49 The judge relied heavily on the lan-
guage in Pickup II in deciding that the conversion therapy ban regulated conduct and
not speech.50 In response to the plaintiffs assertion that counseling was, at its core,
talk therapy, the court looked to three sources which defined the term counseling.51
After examining the language of New Jersey statutory law, as well as two secondary
authorities, the court concluded that the term is in reference to the practice of giving
psychological aid and did not allude to speech interests.52 Indeed, the judge placed
much emphasis on the fact that counseling and talk therapy were never defined with
respect to any free speech interest.53 Ultimately, the judge refused to see counseling as
speech because:
[T]aken to its logical end, it would mean that any regulation of
professional counseling necessarily implicates fundamental First
Amendment free speech rights, and therefore would need to with-
stand heightened scrutiny to be permissible. Such a result runs
counter to the longstanding principle that a state generally may
enact laws rationally regulating professionals, including those pro-
viding medicine and mental health services.54
In affirming the district courts decision, the Third Circuit recently decided the case on
different grounds.55 The court rejected that the law affected only conduct, stating
speech is speech, and it must be analyzed as such for purposes of the First Amend-
ment.56 Because it affected the First Amendment, thecourt decided to employan inter-
mediate scrutiny analysis because the law regulated a profession, which the court
decided did not merit strict scrutiny.57 However, the language of the decision still
reflected a very low standard of review; the court relied on the positions taken by
well-respected institutions such as the ABA, notwithstanding their recognition of the
limited amount of methodologically sound research concerning the harm the therapy
causes.58 Despite this deferential review of the law, this case still recognized that
49 King v. Christie, 981 F. Supp. 2d 296, 303 (D.N.J. 2013), affd sub. nom. King v.
Governor of New Jersey, 767 F.3d 216 (3d Cir. 2014).
50 Id. at 31220 (discussing in detail the Ninth Circuits analysis).
51 Id. at 31517.
52 Id. at 317. It is very important to note, however, that one of the two secondary sources
referred only very generally to medicine and health care in general and did not include the use
of the word counseling. Id.
53 Id.
54 Id. at 319.
55 King v. Governor of New Jersey, 767 F.3d 216, 221 (3d Cir. 2014).
56 Id. at 229.
57 Id. at 23435 (noting that, to survive intermediate scrutiny, the law must directly advance
the governments interest in protecting potential clients from ineffective/harmful professional
services and is not more extensive than it has to be to achieve that purpose).
58 Id. at 23839.
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professional speech is still inherently speech, requiring a First Amendment analysis on
at least some level.59
Maybe because the Pickup cases are the first of their kind, the Supreme Court did
not grant certiorari.60 As more and more states adopt legislation prohibiting this type
of therapy, it is likely that the Supreme Court will eventually grant certiorari if the issue
appears before it again, especially if a circuit split develops.61 While there are very
strong policy implications behind the banning of SOCE, the Supreme Courts ruling
will have large consequences for the psychology community. If the Court does rule
on this issue, the case is very likely to turn on the issue of whether this type of ther-
apyconstitutes speech or conduct.62 On the one hand, if the Supreme Court decides that
this law regulates speech, then the government will be faced with heightened review
whenever it wishes to prohibit a certain type of talk therapy.63 On the other hand, if the
Court rules that gayconversion therapy is mere conduct, then state governments need
only face the deferential rational basis review in regards to psychotherapy.64 As many
of the techniques employed by psychotherapists are done solely through speech be-
tween the therapist and client, such a ruling could seriously undermine this profession.
Indeed, as Judge OScannlains dissenting opinion supports, such a ruling would give
the government much more power to silence speech that is politically unpopular.65
II. PROFESSIONAL REGULATIONS AND THE FIRST AMENDMENT
Courts have long held that a state has an interest in regulating licensed professions
working with its citizens. In Thomas v. Collins,66 Justice Jackson summarizes the states
interest as follows:
59 Id. at 236.
60 Pickup v. Brown, 134 S. Ct. 2871 (2014).
61 See SUP. CT. R. 10(a) (noting that one of the factors the Supreme Court looks to in
granting certiorari is when a United States court of appeals has entered a decision in conflict
with the decision of another United States court of appeals on the same important matter); see
also Lila Shapiro, Conversion Therapy Ban in Pennsylvania Gaining Support, HUFFINGTON
POST (Sept. 18, 2013, 1:51 PM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2013 /09/18/conversion
-therapy-pennsylvania_n_3948815.html (stating that Pennsylvania, Massachusetts, and New
York are also considering enacting similar legislation).
62 Nick Clair, Chapter 835: Gay Conversion Therapy Ban: Protecting Children or
Infringing Rights?, 44 MCGEORGEL.REV. 550, 558 (2013) (Some argue that [SB 1171] vio-
lates the state and federal free speech rights of therapists. Others say that this law simply reg-
ulates conduct, specifically the practice of medicine, and thus does not implicate protected
speech. The constitutionality of [SB 1172] will likely hinge on this distinction. (internal
citations omitted)).
63 See Welch v. Brown, 907 F. Supp. 2d. 1102, 1110 (E.D. Cal. 2012), revd, Pickup II,
740 F.3d 1208 (9th Cir. 2013).
64 See Pickup v. Brown, 740 F.3d 1208, 1231 (9th Cir. 2013) (OScannlain, J., dissenting)
cert denied, 134 S.Ct. 2871 (2014).
65 Id. at 1216 (OScannlain, J., dissenting).
66 323 U.S. 516 (1945), cert denied, 323 U.S. 819 (1945).
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The modern state owes and attempts to perform a duty to protect
the public from those who seek for one purpose or another to ob-
tain its money. When one does so through the practice of a call-
ing, the state may have an interest in shielding the public from
the untrustworthy, the incompetent, or the irresponsible, or against
unauthorized representation of agency.Ausualmethod of perform-
ing this function is through the licensing system.67
Indeed, the States have enacted much legislation regulating a licensed professionals
speech.68 As this Section will address, the legal and medical communities have been
particularly regulated in this regard, often prohibited from making certain statements
or else compelled to give their clients certain information.69
A. Medical Field
The government has long regulated the practice of medicine, often limiting
physicians free speech rights. In Conant v. Walters,70 for example, the federal govern-
ment enacted a law subjecting physicians to punishment by the licensing board for
recommending the use of medical marijuana.71 The Ninth Circuit ultimately held the
law unconstitutional, noting that it deprived physicians of their First Amendment
rights:72 Being a member of a regulated profession does not, as the government sug-
gests, result in a surrender of First Amendment rights.73 The court emphasized the
importance of the doctor-patient relationship and the ability of the doctor to speak
frankly and openly to patients.74 Additionally, the court ruled that this law did not
clearly define what a recommendation was; it seems to have been subject to the
patients understanding of what the doctor communicated.75
67 Natl Assn for Advancement of Psychoanalysis v. Cal. Bd. of Psychology, 228 F.3d 1043,
1054 (9th Cir. 2000), cert denied, 532 U.S. 972 (2001) (quoting Thomas, 323 U.S. at 544
(Jackson, J., concurring)).
68 See, e.g., Robert Kry, The Watchman for Truth: Professional Licensing and the First
Amendment, 23 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 885, 889 (2000) (explaining a number of laws affecting
licensed professionals and the ways in which these regulations may impair ones First
Amendment rights).
69 See, e.g., Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Assn., 436 U.S. 447, 447 (1978) (upholding sanctions
against an attorney for personally soliciting accident victims for the purpose of representing
themonacontingent fee basis); see also Martha Swartz, Physician-Patient Communication and
the First Amendment After Sorrell, 17 MICH. ST. J. MED. & LAW 101, 102 (2012) (citing VA.
CODE ANN. § 32.1-229(7) (West 2012) (requiring doctors to notify patients of the potential risk
of breast cancer and other issues if a mammogram reveals dense breast tissue)).
70 309 F.3d 629 (9th Cir. 2002), cert. denied, 540 U.S. 946 (2003).
71 Id. at 63233.
72 Id. at 632.
73 Id. at 637.
74 Id. at 636.
75 Id. at 639.
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Furthermore, in Wollschlaeger v. Farmer,76 a district court in Florida decided the
constitutionality of a law forbidding physicians from asking patients whether they
owned firearms unless the question is relevant to the patients medical care or safety,
or the safety of others.77 Florida insisted that this law protected its citizens right to
bear arms and from any discrimination physicians may have against gun owners.78 The
court noted that, while the State may have a legitimate interest in protecting the right
of its citizens to own guns, it offered no support, outside some anecdotal evidence, that
this law would achieve either of Floridas stated interests.79 Further, it also stated that
while the State does have an interest in regulating the medical profession, the law was
not sufficiently narrowly tailored to justify the prohibition on speech.80 The court added
that this ban may even prevent a physician from providing potentially life-saving infor-
mation to the client.81 The court then quoted United States v. Alvarez,82 stating, [t]he
mere potential for the exercise of [government censorial power] casts a chill, a chill the
First Amendment cannot permit if free speech, thought, and discourse are to remain
a foundation of our freedom.83 The court also held that the wording of the statute
was vague, leaving the physician uncertain of when he or she may inquire about gun
ownership.84 Thus, the court issued a permanent injunction against the enforcement
of the statute.85 Perhaps unsurprisingly, the injunction was very recently lifted by the
Eleventh Circuit, citing Pickup II in justifying that the law applied to conduct and
not speech.86
These two cases highlight the difficulty legislatures face when trying to prohibit
a physicians speech with his or her client. Indeed, as the Wollschlaeger cases show,
courts use differing standards of scrutiny, and thus come to different results, when
analyzing this issue.87 When states wish to compel a physicians speech, however,
courts are more deferential. In Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania
v. Casey,88 for example, the Pennsylvania legislature enacted a law requiring physi-
cians to give patients certain information regarding abortion at least twenty-four hours
before the procedure.89 The Court ruled this provision constitutional, noting that the
States preference for childbirth over abortion was immaterial; the law still served the
76 880 F. Supp. 2d 1251 (S.D. Fla. 2012), revd, 760 F.3d 1195 (11th Cir. 2014).
77 Id. at 1268.
78 Id. at 1264.
79 Id. at 1264, 1266.
80 Id.
81 Id. at 1267.
82 132 S. Ct. 2537 (2012).
83 Wollschlaeger, 880 F. Supp. 2d at 1267 (quoting Alvarez, 132 S. Ct. at 2548).
84 Id. at 1268.
85 Id. at 1270.
86 Wollschlaeger, 760 F.3d at 1224 (citing Pickup II, 740 F.3d 1208 (9th Cir. 2013)).
87 See id. at 1236; Conant v. Walters, 309 F.3d 629, 63233 (9th Cir. 2002).
88 505 U.S. 833 (1992).
89 Id. at 844.
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legitimate interest of protecting the life of the unborn child.90 In addition, the Supreme
Court noted that the requirement to give information about abortion is no different
than a doctors requirement to give information about any other medical procedure.91
Taken together, these statements indicate that the Court views any requirement of phy-
sicians to supply truthful information about a medical procedure will be held under
rational basis review.92
B. Legal Field
In addition to regulating physicians, states often impose regulations on the legal
profession as well. In Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Association,93 for example, the Ohio
State Bar Association sought sanctions against an attorney who was personally solic-
iting accident victims so that he may represent them in court on a contingent fee basis.94
The attorney argued that because speech was integral in these solicitations, the govern-
ment was restricting his First Amendment rights.95 Responding to this argument, the
court reasoned that this was commercial speech, as it related to a business transaction,
and was thus entitled to a limited measure of protection.96 In a discussion about
the governments interest in preventing personal solicitations, the court noted that
attorneys act as trusted agents of their clients, and as assistants to the courts in search
of a just solution to disputes.97 As the dangers of personal solicitations include
stirring up litigation, assertion of fraudulent claims, debasing the legal profession, and
the potential harm to the solicited client in the form of overreaching, overcharging,
underrepresentation, and misrepresentation, the Court concluded that the government
had the requisite interest to justify the law under the more deferential commercial
speech standard.98
90 Swartz, supra note 69, at 113 (citing Casey, 505 U.S. at 883).
91 Casey, 505 U.S. at 884.
92 See Armour v. City of Indianapolis, 132 S. Ct. 2073, 207980 (2012) (As long as the
Citys distinction has a rational basis, that distinction does not violate the Equal Protection
Clause. This Court has long held that a classification neither involving fundamental rights nor
proceeding among suspect lines . . . cannot run afoul . . . if there is a rational relationship
between the disparity of treatment and some legitimate governmental purpose. (emphasis
added) (internal citations omitted)).
93 436 U.S. 447 (1978).
94 Id. at 44752.
95 Id. at 455.
96 Id. at 45556 (citing Va. Pharmacy Bd. v. Va. Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S.
748, 770 (1976) (holding that commercial speech is not wholly outside the First Amendment
and is entitled to some protection as a result, though it may still be subject to state regulation)).
97 Id. at 460 (quoting Cohen v. Hurley, 336 U.S. 117, 124 (1961)).
98 Id. at 45961 (discussing that commercial speech regulations require an important state
interest, whichwas present in the current case); see also Cent. HudsonGas&Elec. Corp. v. Pub.
Serv. Commn of N.Y., 447 U.S. 557, 566 (1980) (establishing that commercial speech is
subject to intermediate scrutiny, requiring a substantial governmental interest).
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Another case restricting attorney speech, Legal Services Corp. v. Velazquez99
dealt with a law prohibiting lawyers receiving federal funds from the Legal Services
Corporation from engaging in representation involv[ing] effort to amend or otherwise
challenge existing welfare law.100 Under this law, attorneys could not represent cases
challenging the constitutionality of these welfare laws, and would be forced to with-
draw from a case even if such issues arose well into the representation of the client.101
The government tried to compare the facts of this case to that of Rust v. Sullivan,102
where the Court upheld a restriction prohibiting recipients of federal funds from coun-
seling any clients on abortion.103 The Court held that Rust was a special case where the
government used private speakers to transmit specific information pertaining to its
own program.104 Refusing to find the facts of these cases analogous, the Court ruled
that advice given by an attorney to his or her clients could not be considered to be
government speech, even under a generous application of the Rust doctrine.105 In
finding this section of the law to be an unconstitutional restriction on First Amendment
rights, the Court also noted that Congress may not design a subsidy to effect this
serious and fundamental restriction on advocacy of attorneys and the functioning of
the judiciary.106
A final case discussing an attorneys free speech rights is Gentile v. State Bar of
Nevada, which concerned a law restricting what an attorney may publicly say while in
preparation for trial.107 More specifically, the law forbade attorneys from making state-
ments that may influence or affect the outcome of the case.108 The plaintiff was charged
with violating this law during a pretrial press conference held six months before the
case he was working on was supposed to go to trial.109 In finding the law unconstitu-
tional, the Court referenced a balancing test in determining whether a law or regula-
tion may abridge an attorneys free speech rights, weighing the importance of the
States purpose in enacting the law against an attorneys First Amendment rights on
the current issue.110
99 531 U.S. 533 (2001).
100 Id. at 537.
101 Id. at 539.
102 500 U.S. 173 (1991).
103 Velazquez, 531 U.S. at 54243 (citing Rust, 500 U.S. at 173).
104 Id. at 541 (quoting Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of Univ. Of Va., 515 U.S. 819,
833 (1985)).
105 Id. at 54243.
106 Id. at 544.
107 Id. at 1033.
108 Id. (citing NEV. SUP. CT. R. 177(1)).
109 Id.
110 Id. at 105152 (Moreover, this Courts decisions dealing with a lawyers First
Amendment right to solicit business and advertise have not suggested that lawyers are pro-
tected to the same extent as those engaged in other businesses, but have balanced the States
interest in regulating a specialized profession against a lawyers First Amendment interest in
the kind of speech at issue.).
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In addition to regulating what attorneys specifically may do, states have also
enacted legislation prohibiting those not licensed bya state bar from giving legal advice
or acting as a legal professional. In State v. Niska,111 for example, a man was charged
with practicing law without a license.112 While Niska claimed that this prohibition
violated his free speech rights, the court noted that the policy behind the law was not
to quash the political views he was expressing by means of his legal advice and
pleadings, but rather it was to prohibit . . . the unlicensed practice of law.113 The
court noted that his free speech rights were only indirectly limited. Using the Supreme
Courts standard, the court stated that an indirect limitation on speech is constitu-
tional if:
1. The regulation is within the constitutional power of the state;
2. It furthers an important or substantial governmental interest;
3. The governmental interest is unrelated to the suppression of
free expression; [and] 4. The incidental restriction on alleged first
amendment freedoms is no greater than is essential to the further-
ance of that interest.114
The court reasoned that all of these criteria were met, explaining that the state has not
only an important interest in regulating the legal profession, but a compelling one.115
Thus, the incidental and indirect infringement of Niskas First Amendment rights was
not unconstitutional.116
C. Psychology
Unlike other professionals such as medical doctors or lawyers, there is very little
case law regulating psychotherapists and practitioners of talk therapy. Other than
Pickup v. Brown,117 the field of psychology only recognizes two widely known, rele-
vant cases defining the scope of a therapists responsibilities and privileges. The first
of these cases is Tarasoff v. Regents of the University of California.118 In this case, a
client told his psychologist that he planned to harm a fellow student at the University
of California.119 While the psychologist did attempt to warn the police about his pa-
tients threats, he did not warn the intended victim or her family.120 After the patient
carried out his threat and killed the victim, her familysued, arguing that psychologists
111 380 N.W.2d 646 (N.D. 1986).
112 Id. at 648.
113 Id. at 649.
114 Id. (citing United States v. Albertini, 472 U.S. 675 (1985)) (internal citations omitted).
115 Id.
116 Id. at 650.
117 740 F.3d 1208 (9th Cir. 2014).
118 551 P.2d 334 (Cal. 1976).
119 Id. at 339.
120 Id. at 33940.
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have a duty to warn those who they reasonably believe are in danger of grave bodily
harm.121 The court noted that the psychologists and patients share a special relationship,
and that psychologists should be able to recognize when such threats are serious.122
The second, and more related, case is National Association for Advancement of
Psychoanalysis v. California Board of Psychology (NAAP case), which concerned a
California law restricting the practice of psychotherapy only to those licensed by the
States board.123 The plaintiffs alleged that this violated their First Amendment rights,
as psychotherapy is, in essence, the talking cure.124 The court rejected this argument,
noting that the main component of psychotherapy was not speech, but rather the treat-
ment of depression and other mental disorders.125 As such, the court held that this was
not pure speech and subject to regulation by the states police power.126 In determining
this, the court then determined that this regulation was content and viewpoint neutral:127
Californias mental health licensing laws are content-neutral; they do not dictate what
can be said between psychologists and patients during treatment. Nothing in thestatutes
prevents licensed therapists from utilizing psychoanalytical methods or prevents unli-
censed people from engaging in psychoanalysis if no fee is charged.128 Thus, the court
emphasized that California had the power to regulate the practice of psychotherapy
in general and require licensure, but hinted at the fact that this was limited to content-
neutral legislation.129
This line of reasoning was dismissed in the Pickup case, however.130 There, the
court said that the NAAP case court used both a belt and suspenders in its decision,
declaring that a finding either that a regulation is content neutral or dealing with only
conduct, and not speech, would be enough to allow for a rational basis review.131
Indeed, the Pickup court simply ruled that the actual treatment component to con-
version therapy was simply and purely conduct.132 Thus, the court never discussed
whether the law was content-neutral or specific.133
121 Id. at 340.
122 Id. at 34345.
123 228 F.3d 1043, 1047 (9th Cir. 2014).
124 Id. at 1054.
125 Id.
126 Id.
127 Id. at 1055.
128 Id.; see also id. (Jackson, J., concurring) (quoting Thomas v. Collins, 323 U.S. 516, 545
(1945) (I do not think it could make a crime publicly or privately to speak urging persons to
follow or reject any school of medical thought.)).
129 Id. at 105456.
130 Pickup II, 740 F.3d 1208, 1226 (9th Cir. 2014) (discussing NAAP case).
131 Id. at 1231 (discussing NAAP case).
132 Id. at 1229. In Judge OScannlains dissent to the denial of an en banc hearing of the case,
he criticized the ruling for its failure to consider any standard of reviewfor the speech that would
be censured as a result of this law. Id. at 1217 (OScannlain, J., dissenting).
133 Id. at 1231. Interestingly, in King v. Governor of New Jersey, the Third Circuit found that
the law was indeed content-specific. 767 F.3d 216, 237 (3d Cir. 2014).
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III. THE PSYCHOLOGICAL DIFFERENCE: THERAPY AS SPEECH
Essentially, Pickup v. Brown134 reinforces the idea that mental health providers
can be regulated with the same ease as other licensed professionals.135 This Part will
argue, however, that there are inherent differences between talk therapy and giving
medical treatment or legal advice. First, this Part will discuss the nature of the relation-
ship between the therapist and the client, and the ways in which the efficacy of that rela-
tionship thrives on the free speech of both parties. Second, it will discuss the ways in
which this type of relationship does not exist with other professions regulated by the
State, and the ways in which speech is the crucial element of treatment.
A. The Therapist-Client Relationship
The relationship between a client and his or her mental health provider is very
unique.136 In this context, the client is often meeting with the therapist on a very fre-
quent basis, usually at least once per week. In addition, the client is often disclosing
very intimate details that he or she may not have previously disclosed to anyone else.
While there are a number of different theories therapists use when treating their pa-
tients (called therapeutic orientations), most of them involve talk therapy with the
client.137 Indeed, this communication is vital to the relationship; it is often the vehicle
through which a clients change occurs.138 Thus, this Section will analyze the therapist-
client relationship and demonstrate why unrestricted speech is essential for meaningful
counseling and treatment.
In their book on counseling and psychology, Don Dinkmeyer, Jr. and Len Sperry
provide the following quote to describe the nature of the therapeutic relationship:
The proper therapeutic relationship, as we understand it, does not
require transference but a relationship of mutual trust and respect.
134 Pickup II, 740 F.3d at 1208.
135 See Pickup II, 728 F.3d 1208, 122829 (9th Cir. 2014) (discussing that the court will
use the same analysis for psychologists as it would for any other profession when discussing
whether or not a regulation violates the First Amendment).
136 See GORDON WARME, THE PSYCHOTHERAPIST: USE AND ABUSE OF PSYCHOLOGICAL
INFLUENCE 3 (Judith D. Cohen ed., 1996) (noting that a therapists every word, . . . every
gesture, [and] every glance has influence on the patient).
137 See DON DINKMEYER, JR. & LEN SPERRY, COUNSELING AND PSYCHOTHERAPY: AN
INTEGRATED, INDIVIDUAL PSYCHOLOGY APPROACH 911, 76 (3d ed. 2000). The different
theoretical orientations seemingly share all three common tenets, which are, (1) therapeutic
focus, or the centrality of the lifestyle and lifestyle convictions as the focus of psychotherapy;
(2) therapeutic relationship, or the cooperative and collaborative nature of the client-therapist
relationship; and, (3) therapeutic change, or the process of reeducation and reorientation.
Id. at 10.
138 See id. at 7576 (noting that the speech that occurs between the therapist and client is
essential for effective treatment).
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This is more than mere establishment of contact and rapport. Ther-
apeutic cooperation requires an alignment of goals. When the goals
and interests of the patient and therapist clash, no satisfactory rela-
tionship can be established. Winning the patients cooperation for
the common task is a prerequisite for any therapy; maintaining it
requires constant vigilance. What appears as resistance consti-
tutes a discrepancy between the goals of the therapist and those
of the patient.139
Thus, regardless of a talk therapists specific theoretical orientation, the personal
relationship with the client is at the core of the treatment.140 In addition, as was
hinted at in the excerpt above, speech lies at the very core of this relationship from the
very beginning.141
As previously mentioned, the therapists words can have a profound impact on the
client, often guiding his or her thought processes in a way that generates effective
change. It is important to discuss, however, that the therapist is not merely using tech-
nical, general language. His or her advice is tailored to each specific client, reacting to
each unique individual and the issues faced.142 Furthermore, the therapist is always
bringing his or her own experiences into the room, which often affects treatment.143 As
one book notes, [t]here is widespread acceptance now of the belief that analytic
interaction resembles all other interactions as a relationship between two people, each
of whom contributes to the twosome.144 This argument is buttressed by empirical
research concerning the factors that influence client development.145 In one such study,
the researchers concluded that the therapeutic relationship is vital to the success of
treatment.146 Going further, they also stress that continuous and [f]requent evaluation
of relationship factors is essential for experienced clinicians.147
139 Id. at 7576 (quoting RUDOLF DREIKURS, PSYCHODYNAMICS, PSYCHOTHERAPY, AND
COUNSELING: COLLECTED PAPERS 65 (1967)).
140 See id.
141 See id. at 76.
142 See id. at 10809 (describing the ways in which the therapist should tailor the therapeutic
process to each client, forming treatment strategies to adjust the individual problems).
143 See THE THERAPIST AS A PERSON: LIFE CRISES, LIFE CHOICES, LIFE EXPERIENCES, AND
THEIREFFECTSON TREATMENT xiiixxi (Barbara Gerson ed., 1996) [hereinafter Gerson] (Each
[therapists] work is unique, affected by the [therapists] values, assumptions, and psychological
idiosyncrasies, by their own dynamics, passions, ideas and general subjectivity, and by their
experiences and personal development. (citations omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted));
id. at xiv.
144 Id. at xiii.
145 See Michael J. Lambert & Dean E. Barley, Research Summary on the Therapeutic
Relationship and Psychotherapy Outcome, 38 PSYCHOTHERAPY: THEORY, RES, PRAC.,
TRAINING 357 (2001).
146 Id. at 357 (Decades of research indicate that the provision of therapy is an interpersonal
process in which a main curative component is the nature of the therapeutic relationship.).
147 Id. at 359.
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Indeed, the notion that a therapist actually has a personal reaction to a client, one
that affects the treatment, is very popular; in the psychology realm, this is called
countertransference.148 This occurrence makes it very difficult, if not impossible, for
a talk therapist to have a session with a client without some of his or her personal be-
liefs and attitudes having some influence in the session.149 As such, every conversation
the therapist has with his or her clients during his sessions is tainted, at least to some de-
gree, with the personal thoughts and feelings of the therapist.150
As such, the line between treatment and speech in talk therapy is very blurred,
and it may be that no distinction can be made at all. Regulating the type of treatment
a therapist may engage in necessarily restricts the therapists ability to connect with
a client through his or her speech, as he or she normally would be able to do. Especially
if the client is aware of the fact that the therapist is holding back, the client-therapist
relationship is likely to be inhibited and treatment maybe less effective.151 If a client has
a number of goals he or she wishes to achieve through talk therapy, the relationship
may be damaged with the knowledge that the therapist may not be able to work to-
wards one or more of those treatment objectives.152
Additionally, such prohibitions on specific types of talk therapy may also serve
to chill a therapists speech on the subject completely, especially where the prohibition
is broad, as it is with the ban on gay conversion therapy.153 Looking to SB 1172, the
Pickup II court emphasized the fact that the therapist is able to still recommend and
describe gay conversion therapy to minor patients.154 The problem arises, however, in
defining where treatment actually begins for talk therapists. Here, from the moment
148 See Gerson, supra note 143, at xiv (describing how many consider countertransference
to be an automatic, immediate response to meeting with a client, as it describes a subjective
reaction to a client); Steven Reidbord, Countertransference, an Overview, PSYCHOL. TODAY
(May24,2010), http://www.psychologytoday.com/blog/sacramento-street-psychiatry/201003
/countertransference-overview (generally describing the concept of countertransference).
149 See Gerson, supra note 143, at xivxv.
150 See id. at xiiixiv. It should be noted that not even Sigmund Freud, the founder of
psychoanalysis, was immunefromfeelingsofcountertransference, despitebeingheavilyagainst
its use in a therapeutic setting. See CARLGOLDBERG, ONBEINGAPSYCHOTHERAPIST:THEJOUR-
NEY OF THE HEALER 81 (1986) (describing Freuds infatuation with a particular client).
151 It is very important for a therapist to be aware of, and work towards, a clients stated goals,
which is obviouslyverydifficult if the therapist is prohibited fromhelping theclient achievesuch
goals. See DINKMEYER & SPERRY, supra note 139, at 77.
152 Id. (describing that a lack of movement or resistance may arise from a discrepancy
between the goals of the counselor and those of the client).
153 See CAL. BUS.&PROF.CODE § 865(b)(1) (West 2012) (defining SOCE as any practices
by mental health providers that seek to change an individuals sexual orientation, which in-
cludes efforts to change behaviors or gender expressions, or to eliminate or reduce sexual or
romantic attractions or feelings toward individuals of the same sex).
154  740 F.3d 1208, 1231 (9th Cir. 2014) ([The conversion therapy ban] regulates only
treatment, while leaving mental health providers free to discuss and recommend, or recommend
against, SOCE . . . .).
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the client walks into the door, treatment may be said to have begun. While some talk
therapies may use more structured means of treatment, such as formalized goal setting
or conditioningexercises, others focus solelyon the interplayand conversation between
the therapist and client.155 Most, if not all, of these, however, rely on the strength of the
therapist-client relationship as a means to promote treatment progress; without this,
a client may find it difficult to trust and work with the therapist.156 Two essential ques-
tions are then posed: when does this relationship begin to build? does the formation of
this relationship qualify as an aspect of treatment, especially considering its crucial
role to the process?
Considering these questions, the California and New Jersey laws may be more
complicated than their plain language would suggest.157 These statutes do not expressly
prohibit licensed mental health professionals from recommending conversion therapy
or describing it, but they do not expressly permit this behavior, either.158 Looking at
the first question posed above, the answer seems to be that the therapeutic relation-
ship starts immediately when the therapist and client first meet and begin to address the
clients presenting problem.159 If this is the case, then by the time the therapist and cli-
ent get to a point of discussing SOCE, a therapeutic relationship will already exist be-
tween the patient and the client.
This then leads to the second question. An argument could be made that a talk
therapist is actively engaged in treatment from the moment the therapeutic relation-
ship is forged. As this relationship is the primary vehicle for change,160 a therapist may
feel that byrecommending, or even mentioning, conversion therapy(or another banned
therapy), he or she may be liable to the licensing board. Where mere words constitute
treatment, it may be difficult, if not impossible, for therapists to be confident they are
not overstepping their bounds. As such, they may not mention such treatments at all.
Thus, this law may have the effect of completely estopping a therapist from being able
to discuss his or her views on sexual orientation (or the subject of another government
155 See, e.g., Ken Duckworth & Jacob L. Freedman, Cognitive Behavioral Therapy (CBT)?,
NAMI (July 2012), http://www.nami.org/Template.cfm?Section=About_Treatments_and
_Supports&template=/ContentManagement/ContentDisplay.cfm&ContentID=7952
(describing Cognitive Behavioral Therapy, a more structured from of talk therapy).
156 See DINKMEYER&SPERRY, supra note 137, at 76 (noting the importance of mutual trust
and respect between the therapist and client for the success of treatment).
157 CAL.BUS.&PROF.CODE § 865.1 (West 2012) (Under no circumstances shall a mental
health provider engage in sexual orientation change efforts with a patient under 18 years of
age.); N.J.STAT.ANN. § 45:1-55 (West 2013) (A person who is licensed to provide psycho-
logical counseling . . . shall not engage in sexual orientation change efforts with a person under
18 years of age.).
158 The Pickup II and King courts have inferred this ability, however. Pickup II, 740 F.3d at
1229; King v. Christie, 981 F. Supp. 2d 296, 31314 (D.N.J. 2013).
159 See DINKMEYER&SPERRY, supra note 137, at 76 (The effective therapeutic relationship
begins with [the therapists] focusing on the concerns as presented by [the] client.).
160 See id.
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ban) at all. Taken from this point of view, even if the activity of talk therapy is seen as
conduct and not speech, the unique nature of the therapist-client relationship makes it
so that such broad sweeping treatment bans may still have the effect of preventing the
therapist from exercising his First Amendment rights. As the mental health profes-
sionals speech is effectively chilled in this context, courts should still apply heightened
scrutiny to laws regulating what may be said in the therapy room.161
Ultimately, the connection between a therapist and a client is very unique and
difficult to broadly regulate without implicating free speech interests. Effective coun-
seling through talk therapy relies on a strong therapist-client relationship focused on
shared treatment goals. As noted above, as the therapist becomes more limited in what
he or she maybring into treatment, the therapymaybecome less effective. Furthermore,
the therapist may ultimately feel unable to even speak his or her opinions on certain
treatments, as there may be a fear of running afoul of the law through a mere mention
of those therapies. Thus, courts should recognize the unique position a therapist is in
when it comes to wide-sweeping regulations.
B. Differences Between Other Professions
As noted in Part I, courts often grant states much deference in regulating licensed
professionals, even where such regulations may have an impact upon the practitioners
speech.162 Indeed, courts have upheld numerous regulations both limiting and compel-
ling certain types of speech.163 While there are some instances where courts have over-
turned some regulations on the basis of the First Amendment, such as in Conant v.
Walters164 and Legal Services Corp. v. Velazquez (described above),165 these seem to
be the exception rather than the rule. However, very few of these cases actually refer
to psychotherapy specifically.166 Thus, when the Pickup II court looked to case law
in making its decision, there was very little guidance about this specific regulated
profession.167 As such, the courts applied case law regulating different professions,
161 See Conant v. Walters, 309 F.3d 629, 63639 (9th Cir. 2002) (discussing that a law which
chilled a physicians speech was subject to heightened scrutiny).
162 See cases cited supra Part I.
163 See, e.g., Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 901 (1992) (affirming
a lawwhichmandates physicians to disclose certain information to patients seeking an abortion);
Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Assn, 436 U.S. 447, 449 (1978) (upholding a regulation prohibiting
lawyers from conducting in-person solicitations, despite the fact that speech is involved).
164 309 F.3d 629, 632 (9th Cir. 2002) (overturning a law which prohibited doctors from even
recommending medical marijuana, as merely the discussion of medical marijuana was enough
to violate the law).
165 531 U.S. 533, 537 (2001) (ruling unconstitutional a lawwhich prohibited legal services
lawyers from challenging the current welfare laws).
166 See supra Part I.C.
167 In subsequent cases involving legislation regulating SOCE, the language of Pickup II
is heavily cited. See King v. Christie, 981 F. Supp. 2d 296, 31218 (D.N.J. 2013).
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namely the medical and legal fields.168 Instead of recognizing a potential difference
between the different fields, the courts grouped them together. Indeed, both Pickup
cases emphasized the courts view that psychological treatment is perfectly analogous
to medical treatment or legal advice.169 These cases cite, at length, the previously men-
tioned cases regulating doctors and lawyers.170
For example, in Pickup I, the court compares the prohibition of conversion therapy
to the ban on attorney solicitations at issue in the previously described Ohralik case,171
noting that the therapists free speech rights are only marginally affected.172 Addition-
ally, in Pickup II, the court expressly states that it views conversion therapy as a form
of medical treatment, and thus the state has the ability to regulate it.173
Indeed, these cases all rest on the proposition that there is nothing unique about
talk therapy; it can easily be regulated along the same lines as other professions.174
However, as this Section will discuss, talk therapy is substantially different under the
First Amendment than other regulated professions. The first Subsection will describe
the substantial differences between the professional relationship involved in talk ther-
apy and those in other fields. The second Subsection will compare these fields and
demonstrate that, unlike the attorney-client or doctor-patient relationships, the rela-
tionship a therapist develops with a client actually affects the outcome of treatment.
1. Comparing the Professional Relationships
As noted above, the therapist-client interaction is very unique;175 in addition to the
professional nature of the relationship, there is also a personal aspect.176 First, when
a client first begins therapy, the therapist often spends much of the first few sessions
168 See Pickup II, 740 F.3d 1208, 1229 (9th Cir. 2014) (applying cases regarding the
constitutionality of regulations of the medical field); Pickup I, No. 2:12-CV-02487-KJM-EFB,
2012 WL 6021465, at *11 (E.D. Cal. Dec. 4, 2012) (relying on Ohralik, a case concerningregu-
lations on attorneys).
169 Pickup II, 740 F.3d at 1229 (comparing talk therapy to medical treatment); Pickup I, 2012
WL 6021465, at *11 (noting that this issue was akin to prohibiting a lawyer from soliciting
clients); King, 981 F. Supp. 2d at 319 (citing prior decisions in relation to the medical field as
justification for its ruling).
170 See cases cited supra Parts I.AB.
171 Pickup I, 2012 WL 6021465, at *11.
172 Id. (citations omitted) (This case is instead more like Ohralik . . . , in which the Court
rejected a lawyers challenge to professional discipline for his in-person solicitation of clients.).
173 Pickup II, 740 F.3d at 1229 ([This law] regulates conduct. It bans a form of treatment
for minors . . . . (emphasis added)).
174 See id. (noting that SB 1172 is the regulation of professional conduct, where the states
power is great, even though such regulation may have an incidental effect on speech).
175 See supra Part III.A.
176 See DINKMEYER & SPERRY, supra note 137, at 75 (noting that the proper therapeutic
relationship requires a relationship of mutual trust and respect).
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establishing the necessary rapport and a genuine relationship with the client.177 As one
author notes, winning the patients cooperation for the common task is a prerequi-
site for any therapy.178 Additionally, once this relationship is established, the therapist
is constantly tasked with maintaining it.179 Moreover, the therapist and client usually
meet fairly regularly, typically once a week, over an extended period of time.180
With other professions, this personal connection is not as important. Looking first
to the medical field, while it is true that doctors are expected to build rapport with their
clients,181 the scope of the doctor-patient relationship is not nearly as broad as the rela-
tionship between a therapist and client. While a professional relationship with a patient
mayhelp to more easily illicit information or treat an underlying illness or problem,182
the fact remains that this relationship is not necessary as it is with talk therapists.183
A similar limitation exists with attorneys as well; a close professional relationship
is not necessary. Indeed, even where the attorney-client relationship has been com-
pletely destroyed, the lawyer may still be required to continue to represent the client.184
Therapists, however, maymore freely terminate the relationship whenever theysense
that more harm than good is coming from the sessions, emphasizing the importance of
a good rapport and relationship between the therapist and client.185
Second, and more importantly, is the notion that the therapist is actually bringing
parts of his or herself into the therapyroom.186 As previously noted, through the process
of countertransference, the therapist forms reactions to the client, and these reactions
can actually be used beneficially in the treatment.187 It is not just that the therapist has
177 See id. at 7576.
178 Id.
179 Id. at 76.
180 See Stephen Barrett, Mismanagement of Psychotherapy, QUACKWATCH (May 12,
2013), http://www.quackwatch.com/01QuackeryRelatedTopics/mispsych.html (describing
how forms of cognitive therapy are conducted on a weekly basis over the course of fifteen to
twenty-five weeks).
181 See Susan Dorr Goold &MarkLipkin, Jr., TheDoctor-Patient Relationship: Challenges,
Opportunities, and Strategies, 14 J.GEN. INTERNALMED. 26, 2627 (1999) (describing the ne-
cessityofdeveloping agood relationship with thepatient, especiallyduring the initial interview).
182 See id. at 26 (noting that a patient who does not trust or like the practitioner will not
disclose complete information efficiently).
183 See DINKMEYER & SPERRY, supra note 137, at 7576 (describing this relationship as
a prerequisite).
184 See MODELRULES OFPROFLCONDUCT R. 1.16 (1983) (requiring the permission of the
court or tribunal before a lawyer may cease to represent a client).
185 See ETHICAL PRINCIPLES OF PSYCHOLOGISTS AND CODE OF CONDUCT R. 10.10(a)
(2010), www.apa.org/ethics/code/principles.pdf (Psychologists terminate therapy when it
becomes reasonably clear that the client/patient no longer needs the service, is not likely to
benefit, or is being harmed by continued service.).
186 See Reidbord, supra note 150 (describing the ways in which psychologists bring their
own feelings and experiences into the therapy room through the previously discussed notion
of countertransference).
187 See sources cited supra note 150.
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a reaction, but rather that this personal reaction can actually serve a useful purpose.188
With both the legal and medical professions, a personal reaction to a client or patient
is rarely used in providing services to clients and patients. While it is true that lawyers
and doctors employ their subjective reactions to clients and patients in some ways, that
practice is nowhere near as pervasive as with therapists.
Finally, the parameters of the relationship between a therapist and client are much
more private than those involving a doctor or a lawyer. As with these other professions,
therapists are held to a very high standard of confidentiality.189 Indeed, a therapist is
often disallowed from revealing the identity of a client.190 The information shared be-
tween a therapist and his or her client remains much more private than the information
shared with medical doctors or lawyers. In a medical setting, for example, the patient
may be seen by a number of nurses and administrative staff in addition to the doctor,
limiting the overall privacy inherent in the doctor-patient relationship; additionally,
these personnel have access to the patients files and the information therein. In the
legal field, many of the things discussed between an attorney and client may come out
in a courtroom or legal document. The therapist, however, rarely, speaks to others
about the matters discussed in session. Absent client permission or an exigent cir-
cumstance, the information communicated between the client and therapist typically
stays in the room and in the private records of the therapist.191 Indeed, the mere fact
that a therapist is seeing a particular client is confidential information.192 Thus, the
therapist-client relationship better maintains confidentiality than the relationships
entered into with doctors or lawyers, and clients very much rely on this confiden-
tiality during treatment.
For all of these reasons, the Pickup II193 court erred in deciding that talk therapy
could be regulated in the same fashion as other licensed professions. As the rela-
tionship between the therapist and client is different in so many ways from these other
professions, the courts should not rely so heavily on the case law concerning those
regulated fields.
2. Speech as Affecting Treatment
In addition to the notion that the actual relationship is different, talk therapy is also
unique in the sense that, unlike with the legal or medical fields, the spoken words
188 Id.
189 See ETHICALPRINCIPLES OF PSYCHOLOGISTS AND CODE OF CONDUCT R. 04.01 (2010),
available at http://www.apa.org/ethics/code/ (Psychologists have a primary obligation and
take reasonable precautions to protect confidential information obtained through or stored in
any medium . . . .).
190 Id. at 4.064.07.
191 See id. at 4.05 (Psychologists disclose confidential information without the consent of
the individual only as mandated by law for a valid purpose. . . .).
192 See id. at 4.06.
193 740 F.3d 1208 (9th Cir. 2013).
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actually constitute the treatment.194 Indeed, talk therapy is often called the talking
cure.195 In both the medical field and legal fields, regulating certain types of speech
does not significantlyalter the practice in a particular field. For example, in Ohralik, the
Courts decision did not impact the actual practice of law.196 While the attorney could
not actively solicit clients in person, the laws had no effect on the quality or form of
his legal representation.197 Additionally, the restrictions upheld in Casey did little to
actually prevent the performance of the medical procedure.198 While doctors were com-
pelled to make certain disclosures to patients seeking an abortion, this did not impact
the actual performance of the procedure.199
With talk therapy, however, censoring the treatment is the equivalent of censoring
ones speech. While the courts upheld the conversion therapy ban on the grounds that
it only regulated a form of treatment, they shunted aside the reality that many forms of
this therapy deal purely with speech.200 Unlike the numerous other cases these courts
cite to,201 there is no difference here between the practice to be regulated and pure
speech. Indeed, for talk therapists, the only conduct they are engaged in is speaking
with their clients. At least in the realm of the First Amendment, common law concern-
ing the regulation of other professions is incompatible with talk therapy, as there is no
distinction between conduct and pure speech. As the Third Circuit noted in King v.
Governor of New Jersey,202 speech is speech, and it must be analyzed as such for pur-
poses of the First Amendment.203
IV. ALTERNATIVES TO AN OUTRIGHT BAN
It is very important to note that regarding psychotherapy as speech does not
automaticallymake it impossible to regulate; the process is just more difficult.204 This
Part will address the different ways in which the government could reduce the harm
caused by gay conversion therapy, and other forms of therapy as well. First, the state
194 See generally DINKMEYER & SPERRY, supra note 137, at 75109 (discussing the ways
in which the therapist can employ certain language in the therapy room to affect change over the
course of the clients treatment).
195 See Pickup II, 740 F.3d at 1218.
196 See generally Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Assn, 436 U.S. 447 (1978).
197 Id. at 46768.
198 See generally Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992).
199 Id. at 88283.
200 See Pickup II, 740 F.3d at 1229 ([The conversion therapy ban] regulates conduct. It bans
a form of [medical treatment] . . . .  (emphasis added)).
201 See supra Part II.
202 767 F.3d 216 (3d Cir. 2014).
203 Id. at 229.
204 Though perhaps not. The Third Circuit found, without much difficulty, that prohibitions
onSOCE, although considered speech, were still constitutional under an intermediate scrutiny
analysis. Id. at 23740.
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could conduct more empirical research into the specific type of therapy it wishes to
ban so that it can establish an important or compelling interest for the purposes of
heightened review.205
Second, this Part will address the ways in which the government could isolate
and restrict those aspects of treatment, such as electroshock therapy, that do not have
a speech element. By only regulating non-speech therapies, the government will still
be able to further its own agenda while maintaining the free speech rights of those
practicing psychotherapy.
A. Conducting More Research
As noted in the Pickup cases,206 the government has little empirical evidence
clearly demonstrating the harms of gay conversion therapy.207 Anecdotal evidence is
the primarysupport for the states claim that this ban is an important or compelling gov-
ernment interest.208 In fact, gaining enough evidence of harm for this particular type
of therapy may be all but impossible. As one psychologist noted, it is nearly impos-
sible to obtain a random sample of research participants who have been treated for
their sexual orientation.209 Furthermore, he notes that it is equallydifficult toconduct
such research in an environment free from social bias.210 Without this research, it is
very difficult to make any meaningful generalizations about this type of therapy.211
The psychologist noted, however, that without nonrandom surveys, there would prob-
ably be scant data on any aspect of sexual orientation, given the difficulty in accessing
participants who are willing to be surveyed about their sexuality.212 The judge in the
initial Pickup case echoed this sentiment:
[T]here is a dearth of scientifically sound research on the safety
of SOCE. Early and recent research studies provide no clear in-
dication of the prevalence of harmful outcomes among people
who have undergone efforts to change their sexual orientation or
the frequency of occurrence of harm because no study to date of
205 While the Third Circuit stated that it did not need high levels of empirical evidence to find
an important governmental interest, other courts may either applystrict scrutinyor else require
more evidence to establish an important state interest. Id.
206 See Pickup v. Brown, 728 F.3d 1042, 105657 (9th Cir. 2013).
207 Id.
208 Pickup I, No. 2:12-CV-02497-KJM-EFB, 2012 WL 6021465, at *24, (E.D. Cal. Dec. 4,
2012), affd by Pickup II, 740 F.3d 1208 (9th Cir. 2013).
209 Douglas C. Haldeman, Gay Rights, Patient Rights;The ImplicationsofSexualOrientation
Change Therapy, 33 PROF. PSYCHOL.: RES. & PRAC. 260, 261 (2002).
210 Id.
211 Id.
212 Id. (emphasis added).
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adequate scientific rigor has been explicitly designed to do so.
Thus, we cannot conclude how likely it is that harm will occur
from SOCE. However, studies . . . indicate that attempts to
change sexual orientation may cause or exacerbate distress and
poor mental health in some individuals, including depression and
suicidal thoughts.213
Thus, at least for this particular type of therapy, the government may have a heavy
burden to provide enough evidence to establish either an important or a substantial
government interest.214
However, as this Note touches on the government ban of therapeutic practices in
general, it is important to note that it is not nearly as difficult to gather empirical data
for other forms of therapy. For example, there have been countless studies showing the
efficacy of specific treatments for a variety of mental-health related issues, such as
depression215 and posttraumatic stress disorder.216 Thus, in the broader sense, it may be
much easier for the government to acquire the empirical data needed to establish an
important or compelling government interest for the purposes of satisfying heightened
review. Additionally, as the psychological community is continuallyconducting stud-
ies on the efficacy of different methods of psychotherapy, a state may have ready ac-
cess to the necessary data.217 It may very well be that gay conversion therapy is unique
in how difficult it is to gather empirical data as to its efficacy, and not at all a fair rep-
resentation of talk therapy in general.
B. Banning Only the Non-Speech Elements of Psychotherapy
The California and New Jersey laws prohibiting the use of conversion therapy
are very broad; the scope is defined as any treatment aimed at changing a minors sex-
ual orientation.218 The California law specifically notes:
Sexual orientation change efforts means any practices by men-
tal health providers that seek to change an individuals sexual
213 Pickup I, 2012 WL 6021465, at *25 (quoting APA Report, supra note 22).
214 See King v. Governor of New Jersey, 767 F.3d 216, 235 (3d Cir. 2014).
215 See, e.g., Ellen Driessen et al., The Efficacy of Cognitive-Behavioral Therapy and
Psychodynamic Therapy in the Outpatient Treatment of Major Depression: A Randomized
Clinical Trial, 170 AM. J.PSYCHIATRY 1041, 1041 (2013) (looking at the efficacy of a specific
type of therapy, Cognitive-Behavioral Therapy, in particular).
216 See, e.g., Sandra A. Wilson et al., Fifteen-Month Follow-up of Eye Movement
Desensitization and Reprocessing (EMDR) Treatment forPost-traumatic StressDisorder and
Psychological Trauma, 65 J.CONSULTING&CLINICALPSYCHOL. 1047, 1047 (1997) (describing
the efficacy of a specific type of treatment).
217 See supra notes 10405 (providing examples of the ways in which psychologists con-
stantly monitor and assess different treatment methods).
218 CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE § 865(b)(1) (West 2012).
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orientation. This includes efforts to change behaviors or gender
expressions, or to eliminate or reduce sexual or romantic attrac-
tions or feelings toward individuals of the same sex. . . . Sexual
orientation change efforts does not include psychotherapies that:
(A) provide acceptance, support, and understanding of clients or
the facilitation of clients coping, social support, and identity ex-
ploration and development, including sexual orientation-neutral
interventions to prevent or address unlawful conduct or unsafe sex-
ual practices; and (B) do not seek to change sexual orientation.219
The huge breadth of this law can more clearly be seen when paired with a list of the
large number of different treatments that have been developed for the purposes of actu-
alizing a change in sexual orientation. Indeed, the Welch v. Brown220 court spent an
entire paragraph detailing the large number of specific therapy techniques affected by
this law:
Behavior therapists tried a variety of aversion treatments, such as
inducing nausea, vomiting, or paralysis; providing electric shocks;
or having the individual snap an elastic band around the wrist
when the individual became aroused to same-sex erotic images
or thoughts. Other examples of aversive behavioral treatments in-
cluded covert sensitization, shame aversion, systematic desen-
sitization, orgasmic reconditioning, and satration therapy. Some
nonaversive treatments used an educational process of dating
skills, assertiveness, and affection training with physical and social
reinforcement to increase other-sex sexual behaviors. Cognitive
therapists attempted to change gay mens and lesbians thought
patterns by reframing desires, redirecting thoughts, or using
hypnosis, with the goal of changing sexual arousal, behavior,
and orientation.221
With this bill affecting so many different types of treatment, it does not actually ban
one specific type of therapy, but rather the goal of the therapy. While the Third Circuit
maintains that such definitions are not more extensive than necessary to serve the
States interest,222 gay conversion therapy is essentially an umbrella term encom-
passing dozens of treatment methods. Especially with the dearth of knowledge
about the effects of these treatments, it may be that only some are truly harmful.
However, many of the treatments listed above do not have a speech element, such as
219 Id. § 865(b)(1)(2).
220 907 F. Supp. 2d 1102 (E.D. Cal. 2012).
221 Id. at 1112 (quoting APA Report, supra note 22).
222 King v. Governor of New Jersey, 767 F.3d 216, 237 (3d Cir. 2014).
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aversion therapy and conditioning. With these therapies, along with those where
speech is not as deeply imbedded as it is in talk therapy, a state has a lot more leeway
for prohibitions.
As discussed above, courts have continually upheld state regulations prohibiting
certain professional practices that do not inherently embody speech. For example, in
Conant v. Waters,223 the Ninth Circuit ruled that the government could not prohibit a
physician from recommending or discussing medical marijuana with patients.224 How-
ever, the court recognized that it is constitutional to prohibit the speech necessary to
actually write the prescription for marijuana.225 Indeed, Conant reinforces the idea that
as long as speech is not a core aspect of the conduct to be prohibited, a state has much
more power to regulate it.226
Moving beyond the specific example of conversion therapy, there are a number
of areas of psychology where multiple treatment options exist for a single ailment,
problem, or disorder. For example, there are a wealth of treatment options available
for disorders such as depression and anxiety, many of which do not inherently involve
speech.227 As many models of psychotherapy involve non-speech treatment, the gov-
ernment could focus on regulating those models when it believes a particular practice
is especially harmful. This argument is buttressed by the fact that the non-speech treat-
ments seem to pose a greater risk than those posed in mere talk therapy. Thus, by de-
claring talk therapy as speech, the government is not automatically estopped from
taking any action to prevent potential harm. By prohibiting those treatments which do
not rely so heavily on physician speech, such as the aversive treatments for SOCE
described above, a state is still able to mitigate perceived harms without threatening a
therapists First Amendment rights.
C. Compelled Disclosures and More Rigorous Informed Consent
Additionally, instead of working to ban a particular type of speech, a state could
make it such that mental health professionals be required to gather more rigorous in-
formed consent before engaging in talk therapies the state deems to be risky. In the
specific case of gay conversion therapy, for example, a state could require the therapist
to fully disclose the dangers and harms associated with the treatment so that the client
and his or her parents could give their fully informed consent. Indeed, courts are much
223 309 F.3d 629 (9th Cir. 2002).
224 Id. at 639 (2002).
225 Id. at 635.
226 Id. at 637.
227 A GUIDE TO TREATMENTS THAT WORK 22636, 31931 (Peter E. Nathan & Jack M.
Gorman eds., 2d ed.) (2002) (describing the numerous treatment options available for a wide
range of mental disorders and psychological issues, including treatments for both depression
and anxiety).
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less likely to find that professional compelled speech violates the First Amendment
than they are with prohibited speech228:
The practical effect of prohibiting physicians from speaking is
arguably more deleterious than the practical effect of compelling
physicians to speak. When a physician is compelled by the state to
provide certain information to the patient, the patient is able to
weigh the information provided along with other available infor-
mation to test its worthiness. Moreover, the physician is usually
able to disclaim or at least explain the reason that he or she is pro-
viding the information.229
Indeed, [a]ll fifty states have laws that mandate that physicians inform their
patients of the risks, benefits, and alternatives to treatment.230 Furthermore, a states
ability to compel speech is not limited to physicians. For example, in the legal realm,
when lawyers face a potential conflict of interest in a certain case, he or she must gain
informed consent from his clients before continuing representation.231 The American
Psychological Association places an ethical obligation to obtain informed consent
(or informed assent, for minors) before any treatment may begin.232 Thus, by requir-
ing a therapist to warn potential clients of the harms of certain types of therapy in
particular, a state is still able to meet its interest in protecting LGBT youth or other
affected groups.
CONCLUSION
Californias, and subsequently New Jerseys, passage of the ban on conversion
therapygarnered much controversy,233 which swelled even more after Pickup IIs unan-
imous affirmation of the bans constitutionality.234 While some people celebrated this
228 See Swartz, supra note 69, at 11213 (describing how the Casey Court allowed for the
states to compel physician speech in regards to abortion).
229 See id. at 114.
230 Id. at 118.
231 See MODEL RULES OF PROFL CONDUCT R. 1.7 (2012) (noting that, where a conflict of
interest exists, a lawyer may only continue to represent the client if the affected client gives
informed consent, confirmed in writing).
232 See ETHICAL PRINCIPLES OF PSYCHOLOGISTS AND CODE OF CONDUCT R. 3.10(a)(b)
(2010),http://www.apa.org/ethics/code/index.aspx?item=3# (noting that psychologistsengaging
in talk therapy must obtain informed consent of the individual . . . using language that is rea-
sonably understandable to that person).
233 See Ian Lovett, Law Banning Gay Cure Is Upheld in California, N.Y.TIMES (Aug. 29,
2013), http://www.nytimes.com/2013/08/30/us/law-banning-gay-cure-is-upheld-in-california
.html?_r=0 (describing the controversy this law created).
234 See id.
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as a victory for the LGBT community, others, including a Ninth Circuit judge, found
this to be an unconstitutional infringement of the right to free speech.235 As this issue
continues to grow and other states consider adopting similar legislation, it will be very
important to take a step back and look at this through a different lens than gay conver-
sion therapy. While that type of therapy is not considered efficacious and generally
lacks support, a blanket holding that talk therapy is only to be considered as pure
conduct may have dangerous consequences. As this Note demonstrates, the courts at-
tempts at justifying their decisions by citing to common law regulating other profes-
sions ultimately falls flat, as speech is so heavily imbued in talk therapy. While other
professions may use speech in addition to their professional conduct, there is no clear
separation between speech and conduct in the realm of pure talk therapy. Thus, in keep-
ing with the First Amendment, bans on forms of talk therapy should be subject to
heightened scrutiny, with the government using other avenues to discourage prac-
tices it considers ineffective or dangerous. While many people may view a ban of this
particular type of therapy to be in societys best interests, the collateral damage of this
case may ultimately make it easier for professional, and perhaps even nonprofessional,
speech to be suppressed. As stated by Judge OScannlain, [e]mpowered by this ruling
of [the Ninth Circuit], government will have a new and powerful tool to silence
expression based on a political or moral judgment about the content and purpose of
the communications.236
235 Pickup v. Brown, 740 F.3d 1208, 1215 (9th Cir. 2014) (OScannlain, J., dissenting).
236 Id. at 1216.
